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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The global economic and financial crises have exposed weaknesses in economic and budgetary 
surveillance and overall economic governance in the Economic and Monetary Union. The ongoing 
reform of economic governance has already addressed a number of major weaknesses of economic 
surveillance and coordination. To strengthen the existing legislative framework, a legislative 
package on economic governance – the so-called Six Pack – was elaborated and entered into force in 
December 2011. The Six-Pack has strengthened substantially the instruments available for the EU's 
economic policy coordination and multilateral surveillance.  
As the uncertainty relating to the sovereign debt crisis in some Euro Area Member States continued, 
the extent and potential consequences of the spillovers between euro area Member States' economic, 
financial and budgetary situations has become increasingly evident. Based on this rationale and 
building on the Six-Pack, the European Parliament and the Council adopted two further pieces of 
legislation aimed at strengthening the surveillance mechanisms in the euro area which entered into 
force at the end of May 2013. 
This so-called Two-Pack on economic governance comprises two proposals: a regulation on the 
strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States experiencing or threatened 
with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability in the euro area (i.e. the regulation on 
enhanced surveillance) and a regulation on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft 
budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro 
area. This paper focuses on the former of the two regulations mentioned above and attempts to 
explain the key provisions of the new regulation. 
First, the regulation makes Member States experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with 
regard to their financial stability or receiving financial assistance on a precautionary basis subject to 
enhanced surveillance. The economic and financial integration of all Member States and in particular 
those whose currency is the euro, calls for enhanced surveillance to prevent contagion from a 
Member State experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to its financial 
stability to the rest of the euro area and, more broadly, to the Union as a whole. A Member State 
under enhanced surveillance should take measures to address the sources or potential sources of 
difficulties. In addition, the Commission can request specific measures to implement the enhanced 
surveillance regime. The Commission will monitor regularly in liaison with the ECB and with the 
relevant European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and, where appropriate, the IMF the progress 
made in implementing all those measures.  
Second, the new regulation aims at articulating the financial assistance granted outside the 
framework of the Union with the Treaty. During the crisis, financial stability mechanisms have been 
established to provide financial assistance to euro area Member States. Mostly, these mechanisms 
are based on intergovernmental arrangements (e.g. EFSF and ESM). Against that background, the 
regulation aims at ensuring that there is full consistency between the Union multilateral surveillance 
framework established by the Treaty and the possible policy conditions attached to financial 
assistance granted outside the Treaty framework. It sets out notably a clear procedure for preparing 
and adopting macro-economic adjustment programmes.  
Third, the regulation creates a system of post-programme surveillance for countries which have 
received financial assistance, as long as a minimum of 75% of the financial assistance received has 
not been repaid. This will help ensuring that the country concerned remains firmly on track.  
Finally, the paper describes a number of provisions outlined in the legislation that aim at increasing 
accountability and transparency. In particular, this regards the involvement of national parliaments 
and the European Parliament as well as the involvement of relevant stakeholders in the new 
procedures set out in the legislation. 
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1. A NEXT STEP IN STRENGTHENING EU ECONOMIC 
GOVERNANCE 
The global economic and financial crises have exposed weaknesses in economic and budgetary 
surveillance and overall economic governance in the Economic and Monetary Union. The ongoing 
reform of economic governance has already addressed a number of major weaknesses of economic 
surveillance and coordination. The European Semester that was first introduced in 2011 presented an 
integrated approach to surveillance across different policy areas: fiscal, financial, structural and 
labour market policies. The Semester also ensures that Member States receive policy advice before 
they draw up their budgets in the second half of the year. 
To further strengthen the existing legislative framework, a legislative package on economic 
governance – the so-called Six Pack – was elaborated and entered into force in December 2011 (see 
box 1). It represented a major reform of economic governance in the EU with the strengthening of 
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) including through introducing an expenditure rule and a debt 
reduction benchmark. It also set up a new Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) to prevent 
and correct macroeconomic imbalances. For the euro area, enforcement of fiscal and macroeconomic 
surveillance procedures became ensured by financial sanctions. It also introduced minimum 
standards for national fiscal frameworks.  
The Six-Pack legislation strengthened the instruments available for the EU's regular multilateral 
surveillance. In 2012, these instruments were for the first time combined in the European Semester 
with the aim to ensure that country surveillance is widened to cover macro-economic imbalances 
and to provide EU-level policy guidance ex ante to ensure that Member States can take it into 
account in their policy plans.  
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As the uncertainty relating to the sovereign debt crisis in some Euro Area Member States continued, 
the extent and potential consequences of the spillovers between euro area Member States' economic, 
financial and budgetary situations has become increasingly evident. Based on this rationale and 
building on the Six-Pack, the European Parliament and the Council adopted two further pieces of 
legislation aimed at strengthening the surveillance mechanisms in the euro area which entered into 
force at the end of May 2013. 
This so-called Two-Pack on economic governance comprised two proposals: a regulation on the 
strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States experiencing or threatened 
with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability in the euro area (i.e. the regulation on 
enhanced surveillance) and a regulation on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft 
budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro 
Box 1: THE SIX PACK ON ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE 
On 16 November 2011, a legislative package made up of six pieces of legislation was adopted by the co-
legislators. Four of the legislative measures deal with fiscal issues including a wide-ranging reform of the 
Stability and Growth Pact, while two measures aim at detecting and addressing macroeconomic 
imbalances. 
Strengthening the Stability and Growth Pact 
1) Reinforcing of the preventive arm of the SGP (amending regulation 1466/97): The preventive arm of 
the SGP aims at ensuring that fiscal policy is conducted in a sustainable manner over the cycle. The 
monitoring of public finances is therefore based on the new concept of prudent fiscal policy-making that 
should ensure convergence towards the medium term object. The Commission may issue a warning in 
case of significant deviation from the adjustment path. 
2) Reinforcing the corrective arm of the SGP (amending regulation 1467/97): The corrective arm of the 
SGP ensures appropriate policy responses to correct excessive deficits. The regulation is amended so that 
debt developments are followed more closely and put on an equal footing with deficit developments as 
regards decisions linked to the opening the excessive deficit procedure. Member States whose debt 
exceeds 60% of GDP should take steps to reduce it at a satisfactory pace.  
Establishing national fiscal frameworks 
3) A New Directive on requirements for the budgetary framework of the Member States: Since fiscal 
policy-making is decentralised in the EU, it is essential that the objectives of the SGP are reflected in the 
national budgetary frameworks, i.e. the set of elements that form the basis of national fiscal governance 
(national fiscal rules and budgetary procedures). The directive sets out minimum requirements to be 
followed by Member States. 
Preventing and correcting macroeconomic imbalances 
4) A New Regulation on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances: The Regulation 
introduced a Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure broadening thus the macroeconomic surveillance in 
order to avoid harmful macroeconomic imbalances. Member States with macroeconomic imbalances 
should receive recommendations providing guidance on appropriate policy responses. For Member States 
with severe macroeconomic imbalances, including imbalances that jeopardise the proper functioning of 
EMU, an excessive imbalances procedure (EIP) should be initiated. 
Strengthening enforcement 
5) A New Regulation to strengthen enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area: Changes in 
both the preventive and corrective arm of the SGP are backed up by a set of gradual financial sanctions 
for euro-area Member States. As to the preventive arm, an interest-bearing deposit should be the 
consequence of significant deviations from prudent fiscal policy making. In the corrective arm, a non-
interest bearing deposit would apply upon a decision to place a country in excessive deficit. This would 
be converted into a fine in the event of non-compliance with the recommendation to correct the excessive 
deficit.  
6) A New Regulation on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances: If a 
euro-area Member State fails to act on Council recommendations to address excessive imbalances, an 
interesting-bearing deposit can be imposed. This deposit can be turned into a fine after continued non-
compliance. 
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area (see box 2). The rest of this paper focuses on the former of the two regulations mentioned 
above. 
 
2. OBJECTIVES OF THE NEW REGULATION 
As mentioned above, the economic and financial integration of all Member States and in particular 
those whose currency is the euro, calls for some form of enhanced surveillance to prevent contagion 
from a Member State experiencing difficulties with respect to its financial stability to the rest of the 
euro area and, more broadly, to the Union as a whole. This new form of enhanced surveillance 
originated from the discussions on the guideline on precautionary financial assistance of the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF, see box 3). 
When the operational guidelines for the functioning of the EFSF were elaborated, it was envisaged 
to establish a new form of enhanced surveillance that would be less intrusive than the monitoring 
under a macro-economic adjustment programme while still going beyond the regular EU multilateral 
surveillance under the European Semester. This new form of enhanced surveillance provided the 
Commission with important new powers including to obtain crucial information (e.g. fiscal data, 
disaggregated data on financial institutions) and to require stress test exercises or sensitivity analyses 
in the banking sector.  
Following the establishment of the enhanced surveillance in the EFSF guidelines, this new form of 
surveillance was also introduced into the operational guidelines for the European Stabilisation 
Mechanism (ESM) and codified in the Two-Pack regulation on enhanced surveillance. The new 
enhanced surveillance regulation of the Two-Pack contains a number of precise objectives. 
First, the regulation makes Member States experiencing severe difficulties with regard to their 
financial stability or receiving financial assistance on a precautionary basis subject to a new form of 
enhanced surveillance. A Member State under enhanced surveillance has to take measures to address 
the sources or potential sources of difficulties. In addition, the Commission can request specific 
measures to implement the enhanced surveillance. The Commission will monitor regularly in liaison 
with the ECB and with the relevant European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and, where 
appropriate, the IMF the progress made in implementing all those measures. If the assessment of 
progress made concludes that further measures are needed and that the financial situation of the 
Member State has significant adverse effects on the financial stability of the euro area, the Council 
has the possibility to recommend to the Member State concerned to adopt precautionary corrective 
measures or prepare a draft macro-economic adjustment programme.  
Second, the new regulation aims at articulating the financial assistance granted outside the 
framework of the Union with the Treaty. During the crisis, new financial stability mechanisms have 
been established to provide financial assistance to euro area Member States. Mostly, these new 
BOX 2:  THE TWO-PACK ON ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE 
At the beginning of 2013, a legislative package made up of two pieces of legislation was adopted by the 
co-legislators. Whereas one regulation provides for enhanced surveillance of euro area Member States 
experiencing severe difficulties regarding their financial stability, the other ensures a further 
strengthening of fiscal surveillance. 
1) A new regulation on enhanced surveillance in the euro area: The regulation implies that Member 
States experiencing severe difficulties with regard to their financial stability or receiving financial 
assistance on a precautionary basis would be subject to enhanced surveillance. The new regulation 
articulates the financial assistance granted outside the framework of the Union (e.g. ESM, EFSF) with the 
Treaty and creates post-programme surveillance for countries which have received loans or have drawn 
precautionary financial assistance. 
2) A new regulation ensuring deeper fiscal surveillance: the regulation complements the European 
semester with a common budgetary timeline and complements the procedure for the correction of a 
Member State's excessive deficit by a closer monitoring of budgetary policies of Member States subject 
to an excessive deficit in order to secure a timely and durable correction of excessive deficits. 
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mechanisms are based on intergovernmental arrangements (e.g. EFSF and ESM, see box 3). Against 
that background, the regulation aims at ensuring that there is full consistency between the Union 
multilateral surveillance framework established by the TFEU and the possible policy conditions 
attached to financial assistance granted outside the Treaty framework. It sets out notably a clear 
procedure for preparing and adopting macro-economic adjustment programmes. Because of the 
wide-encompassing nature of those adjustment programmes, it is foreseen in the new legislation to 
suspend the monitoring and reporting on the implementation of the stability and growth pact, the 
application of the excessive imbalance procedure and the monitoring under the European semester. 
The aim of these suspensions is to ensure consistency and avoid overlaps between these procedures 
and the policies and monitoring taking place in the context of the relevant macro-economic 
adjustment programmes. 
Third, the regulation provides for post-programme surveillance of countries which have received 
financial assistance, as long as a minimum of 75% of the financial assistance received has not been 
repaid. This will help ensuring that the country concerned remains firmly on a safe track, to the 
benefit of the Member State itself and of its lenders. 
 
BOX 3: ESTABLISHING A FRAMEWORK TO ARTICULATE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE UNDER THE EFSF AND THE ESM 
WITHIN AN EU CONTEXT 
 
The EFSF and ESM have been developed as intergovernmental organisations outside of the EU Treaties. 
One of the new regulation's key objectives is therefore to establish a decision-making and surveillance 
framework to articulate the functioning of the EFSF and the ESM with the chapter on economic and 
monetary union in the TFEU. The intergovernmental nature of these two stability mechanisms requires, as 
a rule, decisions on financial support to be taken by unanimity thereby rendering their functioning less 
flexible. This contrasts with the operation of the EFSM which as an EU stability mechanism can take 
decisions by qualified majority voting. The reference to the EFSM in the legislation was not required to 
articulate this mechanism within the EU framework but rather to extend the scope of the existing EFSM-
legislation to include a number of useful additions including for example the possibility to provide for post-
programme surveillance. 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF): The objective of the EFSF is to preserve the financial 
stability of the Economic and Monetary Union by providing temporary stability support to euro area 
Member States. It is a "société anonyme" set up by the euro are Member States under Luxembourg law on 
7 June 2010 mandated to provide financial assistance on a temporary basis. It obtains financing by issuing 
bonds or other debt instruments on the financial markets backed by guarantees of the shareholder Member 
States. The EFSF has effective guarantees totaling €726 billion that provide a lending capacity of € 440 
billion.1 It is authorized to use a number of financial support instruments linked to appropriate 
conditionality to serve the needs of a Member State seeking stability support. Graph 1 shows that most of 
the EFSF funds have been attributed to the second Greek financial support package. Important amounts 
were also made available for the financial support packages to Ireland and Portugal. It should be noted that 
the financial support for the Spanish bank recapitalisation was initiated under the EFSF and afterwards 
transferred to the ESM (see below). Graph 1 also shows that while the disbursements take place during the 
period of the financial support programmes (see table 1), the repayments are spread over a long period of 
time. 
                                                 
1 The combined lending capacity of the EFSF and the ESM has been limited to € 700 billion at the Eurogroup meeting of 30 March 2012. It was then 
agreed that the ESM would finance all new support programmes for the euro area while existing programmes would continue to be financed by the EFSF 
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Graph 1: Net outstanding EFSF support 2  
 
Source: European Commission, EFSF and own calculations (bn euros on Y-axis, years on X-axis) 
 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM): The ESM is a permanent international financial institution that 
assists in preserving the financial stability of the euro area by providing temporary stability support to euro 
area Member States. The ESM was inaugurated on 8 October 2012 upon completion of the ratification 
process of the ESM Treaty. The ESM obtains financing by issuing bonds or other debt instruments. Unlike 
the EFSF, which was based upon euro area Member State guarantees, the ESM is based on a total 
subscribed capital of €700 billion provided by euro area Member States. €80 billion of this amount is in the 
form of paid-in capital of which €32bn has already been provided and with the remaining €620 billion as 
callable capital. This subscribed capital provides a lending capacity for the ESM of €500 billion. Like the 
EFSF, the ESM can use a number of financing instruments that are linked to appropriate conditionality. 
The ESM started its activities with the provision of around €40 billion for the recapitalisation of the 
Spanish banking sector at the end of 2012. Graph 2 shows that ESM funds have been disbursed for Spain 
and also for the new financial support programme in Cyprus. Repayments of the financial support are 
spread out over a long period of time with an initial period that no repayments have to be made.  
Graph 2: Net outstanding ESM support 3  
 
Source: European Commission, ESM and own calculations (bn euros on Y-axis, years on X-axis) 
                                                 
2  This corresponds with the amount of disbursements minus repayments. The amounts disbursed and their maturities are decided on a case by case basis 
following the quarterly review of the financial assistance. As a consequence, future disbursements and their maturities are estimates based on available info 
in February 2013.  
3  This corresponds with the amount of disbursements minus repayments. The amounts disbursed and their maturities are decided on a case by case basis 
following the quarterly review of the financial assistance. As a consequence, future disbursements and their maturities are estimates based on available info 
in May 2013.  
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European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM): In contrast with the EFSF and the ESM, the 
EFSM is a temporary EU financial stability mechanism based on the EU Treaty. The European 
Commission, acting on behalf of the EU is empowered to issue debt instruments in the capital markets and 
to use the resources to provide financial assistance to EU member states experiencing financial stability 
problems. The EFSM's capacity is determined by the margin available under the own resources decision 
(i.e. estimated at around €60 billion at the time of its creation). The EFSM is not backed by Member State 
guarantees or capital but directly by the EU budget. Unlike the EFSF and the ESM that have different 
financial support instruments at their disposal, the EFSM can only provide loans and credit lines. Graph 3 
shows that the EFSM funds were mainly attributed to the Irish and the Portuguese financial support 
packages. Repayments are scheduled gradually over time. 
 
Graph 3: Net outstanding EFSM support 4  
 
Source: European Commission and own calculations (bn euros on Y-axis, years on X-axis 
 
 
 
3. ESTABLISHING AN EU ENHANCED SURVEILLANCE  
3.1 Definition 
The new regulation allows the Commission in certain situations to make a Member State subject to 
enhanced surveillance. This surveillance involves an obligation on the Member State to adopt 
measures to address the sources of financial instability (see box 4). When developing those 
measures, the recommendations already addressed by the Council to that Member State should be 
taken into account. In addition, the Commission can request specific measures to implement the 
enhanced surveillance: 1) A stress test on banks to be implemented by the ECB/EBA;5 2) An 
assessment of the domestic financial supervisory capacity to be implemented by the ECB/EBA; 3) 
Any information needed for the monitoring of macro-economic imbalances; 4) A comprehensive 
independent audit of the public accounts of all sub sectors of the general government; 5) Any 
information available for the monitoring of the fiscal deficit; 6) Access to disaggregated data on the 
developments of the financial sector.6 In addition, Member States must also meet new reporting 
requirements foreseen for countries under the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) irrespective of the 
existence of the latter.7 The measures to address the sources of financial instability constitute 
together with the specific measures to implement enhanced surveillance the set of policy 
requirements that are linked to the enhanced surveillance. These policy requirements are expected to 
be set out in some kind of "Letter of Intent" by the Member State (see box 5).  
                                                 
4  This corresponds with the amount of disbursements minus repayments. The amounts disbursed and their maturities are decided on a case by case basis 
following the quarterly review of the financial assistance. As a consequence, future disbursements and their maturities are estimates based on available info 
in February 2013. 
5 These activities will be undertaken by the ECB once the SSM enters into force and by the EBA as long as this is not the case.  
6 This is only the case for ESR with precautionary financial assistance and not for the regular ESR. In the latter case, the disaggregated data can only be 
provided through the intermediation of the ECB, in its supervisory capacity, and where appropriate through the relevant ESAs.  
7 Irrespective of the existence of an excessive deficit, the Member State subject to enhanced surveillance needs to fulfil some of the new reporting 
requirements foreseen for countries under EDP as set out in the other two-pack regulation on closer budgetary monitoring. 
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Regular review missions are conducted by the Commission in liaison with the ECB and the relevant 
European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and, where appropriate the IMF, to verify progress with 
implementation of the policy requirements by the Member State concerned. In addition, the 
Commission is responsible for quarterly reporting to the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) 
of the Council and to the Economic and Financial Committee (ECON) of the European Parliament to 
communicate the findings of the reviews missions.  The enhanced surveillance applies in two 
different situations: 
o Regular enhanced surveillance: the Commission makes a euro area Member State subject to 
enhanced surveillance when it is facing or experiencing severe difficulties with regard to 
financial stability. This is a situation where no financial support is provided. 
o Enhanced surveillance with precautionary financial assistance: the Commission is obliged 
to make a euro area Member State subject to enhanced surveillance in case a Member State 
receives precautionary financial assistance from the ESM/EFSF under an Enhanced 
Conditions Credit Line (ECCL) or a Precautionary Conditioned Credit line (PCCL) when 
the latter has been drawn.8  
The objective of precautionary financial assistance is to support sound policies and prevent crisis 
situations by allowing euro area Members to secure the possibility to access financial assistance 
before they face major difficulties with raising funds in the capital markets. Precautionary financial 
assistance aims at helping euro area Members whose economic conditions are still relatively sound 
to maintain continuous access to market financing.  
There are clear policy conditions attached to the precautionary financial assistance depending on the 
form that the financial assistance takes: a PCCL or an ECCL. These policy conditions are outlined in 
the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU, see box 5) in line with the relevant ESM/EFSF 
guidelines on precautionary financial assistance (see annex 1). The MoU is negotiated with the 
Member State concerned by the Commission on behalf of the ESM/EFSF and in liaison with the 
ECB and, wherever possible, together with the IMF. In addition to the monitoring of the policy 
requirements mentioned above, the Commission also monitors the implementation of the policy 
conditions outlined in the MoU (see box 5). 
The Commission will only make a Member State under a PCCL subject to enhanced surveillance 
when the credit line is effectively drawn. A number of eligibility criteria need to be fulfilled for euro 
area Member States to obtain access to a PCCL. The PCCL is accessible for euro area Member 
States where the economic and financial situation is still fundamentally sound and that at the same 
time fulfil a set of eligibility criteria including: 1) respect for the commitments  under the Stability 
and Growth Pact. An ESM Member under excessive deficit procedure may still access a PCCL, 
provided it fully abides by the Council decisions and recommendations aimed at ensuring a smooth 
and accelerated correction of its excessive deficit; 2) a sustainable level of government debt; 3) 
respect for the commitments under the macroeconomic imbalances procedure. An ESM Member 
                                                 
8 Under the ESM/EFSF financial stability mechanisms, precautionary financial assistance may be provided via a Precautionary Conditioned Credit Line 
(PCCL) or via an Enhanced Conditions (ECCL) (see annex 1).  
BOX 4: ARTICLE 3: ENHANCED SURVEILLANCE 
 
Paragraph 1: A Member State subject to enhanced surveillance shall,  after consulting  and in cooperation 
with the Commission, acting in liaison with the European Central Bank (ECB), the ESAs, the ESRB and, 
where appropriate, the IMF, adopt measures aimed at addressing the sources or potential sources of 
difficulties. In so doing, the Member State shall take into account any recommendations addressed to 
them under Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of budgetary 
positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, Council Regulation (EC) No 
1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit 
procedure, or Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011, concerning its national reform programmes and its stability 
programme […] 
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under EIP may still access a PCCL, provided it is established that it remains committed to 
addressing the imbalances identified by the Council; 4) a track record of access to international 
capital market on reasonable terms; 4) a sustainable external position; 5) absence of any bank 
solvency problems that would pose systemic threats to the stability of the euro area banking system 
(see annex 1). The eligibility criteria for accessing a PCCL also need to be respected by the ESM 
Member after the precautionary assistance is granted. Therefore, they are included as policy 
conditions in the MoU (see box 5). 
Access to an ECCL is open to euro area Member States that do not comply with some of the 
eligibility criteria required for accessing the PCCL but whose general economic and financial 
situation remains sound. Like the PCCL, the ECCL is a credit line based on meeting a set of 
eligibility criteria. In addition, even if no money is drawn, also a set of corrective measures need to 
be taken aimed at addressing the identified weaknesses and avoiding any future problems regarding 
market financing while ensuring a continuous respect of the eligibility criteria which were 
considered met when the credit line was granted. Both the eligibility criteria and the corrective 
measures are included in the MoU detailing the set of policy conditions attached to the financial 
assistance (see box 5).  
 
BOX 5: COMPARING EU AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL ARRANGEMENTS 
 
The policy requirements linked to the enhanced surveillance are applied to the Member States 
within the EU framework while the policy conditions linked to the precautionary financial 
assistance are applied in an intergovernmental context. This distinction is important because of 
the different implications of the Commission's monitoring role. Within the EU framework, the 
Commission's assessment of the overall economic situation and of the implementation of the 
policy requirements can lead to a recommendation to a Member State to adopt precautionary 
corrective measures or to prepare a draft macroeconomic adjustment programme. Within the 
intergovernmental framework, however, the Commission assessment of the respect of the policy 
conditions can lead to the termination of the financial assistance. 
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3.2 Activation 
In order to activate the regular enhanced surveillance, the Commission needs first to provide an 
assessment whether a Member State is experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with 
regard to its financial stability that are likely to have adverse spill-over effect on other euro area 
Member States (see box 6). If this condition is fulfilled, the Commission may unilaterally decide to 
make the Member State subject to regular enhanced surveillance in accordance with article 2.1 of the 
new regulation. 
In case a Member State is receiving financial assistance on a precautionary basis (i.e. PCCL or 
ECCL), the Commission is required by the legislation to make the Member State subject to 
enhanced surveillance in accordance with article 2.3. However, in case of a PCCL, the Commission 
shall not make the Member State subject to enhanced surveillance as long as the credit line is not 
drawn (article 2.4).  
 
As outlined above, a Commission assessment is required as a basis for the Commission decision to 
make euro area Member States subject to enhanced surveillance. A number of parameters need to be 
investigated in this comprehensive assessment to check whether the Member State concerned is 
experiencing or threatened with serious economic difficulties with regard to its financial stability 
that are likely to have negative spill-over effects on other Member States. When conducting this 
comprehensive assessment, the legislation requires the Commission explicitly to take a number of 
parameters into account (article 2.1): 
• the parameters of the alert mechanism9 
                                                 
9 The Alert Mechanism Report (AMR) is published in the context of the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP). This procedure aims at correcting 
and preventing damaging macroeconomic imbalances. Based on the AMR, which is the first step in the MIP procedure, the Commission suggests to 
conduct a number of in-depth reviews (IDRs) to further investigate the developments related to the accumulation and unwinding of macroeconomic 
imbalances in the EU Member States. If macroeconomic imbalances are considered unproblematic, the Commission will propose that no further steps are 
needed. If the Commission considers that macroeconomic imbalances or the risk thereof do exist, it will come forward with preventive recommendations 
BOX 6: ARTICLE 2: MEMBER STATES UNDER ENHANCED SURVEILLANCE 
 
Paragraph 1: "The Commission may decide to subject to enhanced surveillance a Member State 
experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to its financial stability which are likely 
to have adverse spill-over effects on other Member States in the euro area. When assessing whether a 
Member State is threatened with serious difficulties with respect to its financial stability, the Commission 
shall use among other parameters the alert mechanism established under article 3.1 of regulation (EU) No 
1176/2011 of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 November on the prevention and correction 
of macroeconomic imbalances or, where available, the latest in-depth review. The Commission shall also 
conduct a comprehensive assessment, taking into account, in particular, the borrowing conditions of that 
Member State, the repayment profile of its debt obligations, the robustness of its budgetary framework, 
the long term sustainability of its public finances, the importance of its debt burden and the risk of 
contagion from severe tensions in its financial sector on its budgetary situation or on the financial sector 
of other Member States. The Member State concerned shall be given the opportunity to express its views 
before the Commission adopts its decision to subject that Member State to enhanced surveillance. Every 
six months, the Commission shall decide whether to prolong the enhanced surveillance of that Member 
State."  
Paragraph 3: "Where a member State is in receipt of financial assistance on a precautionary basis from 
one or several other Member States or third countries, the EFSM, the ESM, the EFSF or any other 
relevant international financial institution, such as the IMF, the Commission shall subject that Member 
State to enhanced surveillance." 
Paragraph 4: "Paragraph 3 shall not apply to a Member State receiving financial assistance on a 
precautionary basis in the form of a credit line which is not conditional on that Member State adopting 
new policy measures provided that the credit line is not drawn. 
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• the latest in-depth review, where available (IDR)10 
• the borrowing conditions of that Member State 
• the repayment profile of its debt obligations 
• the robustness of its budgetary framework 
• the long term sustainability of its public finances 
• the importance of the debt burden, 
• the risk of contagion from severe tensions in its financial sector on its fiscal situation or on 
the financial sector from other Member States. 
 
4. ESTABLISHING AN EU FRAMEWORK FOR 
MACROECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMMES 
 
When a Member State is under enhanced surveillance, the Commission will monitor regularly, in 
liaison with the ECB and where appropriate with the IMF, the progress made. If the assessment 
concludes that further measures are needed and the financial situation of the Member State has 
significant adverse effects on the financial stability of the euro area, the Council has the possibility 
to recommend to the Member State concerned to prepare a macro-economic adjustment programme.  
4.1. Preparation and adoption of adjustment programmes 
Article 7 of the new regulation sets out a clear procedure for preparing and adopting a macro-
economic adjustment programme. The draft programme is prepared by the Member State requesting 
the financial assistance in agreement with the Commission acting in liaison with the ECB and, where 
appropriate, with the IMF (article 7.1). The draft programme shall be based on an assessment of the 
sustainability of the government debt prepared by the Commission, in liaison with the ECB, and, 
where possible, with the IMF. It shall address the specific risks emanating from that Member State 
for the financial stability of the euro area and shall aim at rapidly re-establishing a sound and 
sustainable economic and financial situation and restoring the Member State's capacity to finance 
itself fully on the markets.  
The draft programme prepared by the Member State requesting financial assistance within the EU 
framework is approved in the Council by qualified majority voting on a proposal from the 
Commission (article 7.2). Within the intergovernmental framework, the memorandum of 
understanding (MoU) outlining the policy conditions attached to the financial assistance provided in 
the context of the macroeconomic adjustment programme, is signed by the Commission on behalf of 
the EFSF/ESM with the Member State requesting financial assistance. The MoU and the Council 
decision on the adjustment programme need to be aligned and fully consistent. The aim is to avoid 
situations where a Member State would be requested to abide by policy conditions in the MoU that 
would deviate from its commitments under the existing EU multilateral surveillance procedures.  
It is also ensured in the legislation that the same logic, i.e. to ensure full consistence of the MoU 
with the Council decision, would apply to financial assistance coming without a macroeconomic 
adjustment programme (e.g. financial support for the recapitalisation of banks). The legislation 
therefore includes a reference to the fact that the main policy conditions that are attached to financial 
                                                                                                                                        
for the Member State(s) concerned. If the Commission considers that there are severe imbalances in a Member State, the Commission will recommend to 
the Council to open an excessive imbalances procedure which constitutes the corrective arm of the new procedure. 
10 See previous footnote for explanations 
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assistance would in such cases also be agreed through a Council decision to the extent that the 
content of those measures falls under the competence of the Union as laid down by the TFEU.  
As illustrated by table 1, adjustment programmes are agreed for a typical duration of two or three 
years. In accordance with article 16, the new regulation applies to the Member States that are 
currently under a macroeconomic adjustment programme.  
Table 1: Planning of macroeconomic adjustment programmes in the euro area 
 
Programme dates - Euro Area 
Programme Start End 
Greece (I) 2010 (May) 2012 (Mar) 
Ireland 2010 (Dec) 2013 (Dec) 
Portugal 2011 (May) 2014 (May) 
Greece (II) 2012 (Mar) 2014 (Mar) 
Cyprus 2013 (Apr) 2016 (Apr) 
 
Source: European Commission and EFSF 
 
 
 
4.2. Monitoring adjustment programmes and non-compliance 
The Commission, in liaison with the ECB and, where appropriate, with the IMF will ensure the 
monitoring of the implementation of the programme. It shall inform the Economic and Financial 
Committee (EFC) every three months. The Member State concerned shall give its full cooperation to 
the Commission and the ECB and provide all the information that they deem necessary for the 
monitoring of the programme.  
If the monitoring highlights significant deviations from the macroeconomic adjustment programme, 
the Council may decide that the Member State concerned does not comply with the policy 
requirements contained in the programme. This decision would have very significant effects because 
it would de facto trigger the interruption of the disbursements of the financial assistance of the 
EFSF/ESM. 
A Member State subject to a macroeconomic adjustment programme experiencing insufficient 
administrative capacity or significant problems in the implementation of its adjustment programme 
can seek technical assistance from the Commission. The Commission can then establish, for this 
purpose, a group of experts with Member States and other Union and/or relevant international 
institutions. Such technical assistance may include the establishment of a resident representative and 
supporting staff to advise authorities on the adjustment programme implementation. An example of 
this kind of technical assistance is the Greek Task Force that was established in the context of the 
Greek adjustment programme. 
4.3. Ensuring consistency with other surveillance processes 
Macro-economic adjustment programmes have a broad scope in terms of policy fields covered. They 
cover all policies that can be identified as likely to improve the economic and financial situation. It 
follows that all attention naturally focuses on the monitoring of the adjustment programme in 
particular because it conditions the disbursements of the financial assistance. Without compliance 
with the macroeconomic adjustment programme, the financial assistance cannot be disbursed. As the 
macroeconomic adjustment programme normally encompasses all relevant policy advice given in 
the context of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure 
(MIP) and the EU semester (see Article 7.1), the new legislation avoids duplication of reporting 
obligations and overburdening by suspending the reporting and monitoring on the implementation of 
the SGP, the application of the MIP, the monitoring under the European Semester and the other 
regulation of the Two-pack on fiscal issues.  
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4.4. Establishing post-programme surveillance 
The new regulation establishes post-programme surveillance.11 This surveillance arrangement aims 
at ensuring that the beneficiary remains on the right fiscal track, thus protecting its capacity to repay 
its debt. The regulation retains a benchmark for the duration of the surveillance. Post-programme 
surveillance will continue as long as a country has not repaid 75% of its debt. In accordance with 
article 14 of the new regulation, the 75% rule applies only to the financial assistance received from 
one or several other Member State(s), the EFSM, the ESM or the EFSF but not for assistance 
received from the IMF or third countries.  
Under the new regulation, the Commission has monitoring powers and has to report twice a year. 
Where appropriate, it can propose to the Council to recommend to the Member State concerned to 
adopt corrective measures. The use of reverse qualified majority voting (RMQV, see box 7) as 
decision-making rule has been inserted in the legislation in relation to decisions to extend the 
duration of the post-assistance surveillance and also to adopt corrective measures. The Council, on a 
proposal from the Commission may extend the duration of the post-programme surveillance in case 
of persisting risks to the financial stability or fiscal sustainability of the Member State concerned. In 
that case, the proposal of the Commission is automatically adopted unless the Council decides by 
qualified majority to reject it within 10 days of the Commission's adoption thereof. The same 
decision-making procedure applies when the Commission proposes to adopt additional corrective 
measures.  
 
 
5. INCREASING ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY 
5.1. Involvement of the European and national parliaments 
Based on article 121(6) of the TFEU, the European Parliament acts as co-legislator of the enhanced 
surveillance regulation. This specific legislative role of the Parliament should be distinguished from 
having a direct role in the conduct of economic surveillance. As outlined in article 121(3) TFEU, the 
responsibility for the monitoring of economic developments in each Member State is entrusted to the 
Council and the European Commission. 
                                                 
11 In accordance with article 17, Member States that are already under post-programme surveillance on 30 May 2013 shall be subject to the post-
programme surveillance rules, conditions and procedures applicable to the financial assistance from which they benefit. 
BOX 7: REVERSE QUALIFIED MAJORITY VOTING 
 
The application of reverse qualified majority voting (RQMV) can contribute to swifter decision-making 
procedures in economic governance. RQMV has been incorporated extensively in the Six Pack 
legislation on Economic governance for strengthening decision-making in the Stability and Growth Pack 
and the new Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure. 
In case of RQMV, a Council decision on a Commission recommendation is deemed to be adopted by the 
Council unless it decides, by qualified majority, to reject the recommendation within ten days of the 
Commission adopting it. Whereas in the normal QMV procedure a qualified minority suffices to block 
the decision-making process, in case of RQMV a qualified majority is required thereby substantially 
increasing the threshold for a coalition of Member States to block decision-making. 
The traditional decision-making rule in the Council is qualified majority voting. From a legal perspective, 
it is only possible to apply reverse QMV in case of implementing measures created by secondary law. It 
is not allowed for measures directly envisaged in the Treaty itself. For these latter measures, Article 16(3) 
TEU provides that the Council acts "by a qualified majority except where the Treaties provide 
otherwise". 
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However, the Parliament's role goes beyond a one-off input in the legislative process in holding the 
executives (i.e. the Commission and the Council) accountable for their conduct of surveillance. In 
order to play this role, it is foreseen in the new regulation that the European Parliament has to be 
informed in a timely matter on decision-making and the outcomes of the economic surveillance 
process. Moreover, the Parliament can organise debates in the context of an economic dialogue with 
other EU institutions and the Member States. As most of the financial stability decisions are crucial 
for the Member States because of their important budgetary implications, also provisions have been 
included in the legislation to increase the involvement of the national parliaments. 
 
 
 
 
BOX 8: KEY ARTICLES ON THE INVOLVEMENT OF PARLIAMENTS 
 
Information flow 
The timely flow of information to the European Parliament and the national parliaments is provided for in 
the legislation in the following articles: 
Article 3 on enhanced surveillance: during the enhanced surveillance, the Commission shall communicate 
every quarter its assessment to the competent committee of the European Parliament. 
Article 7 on the adjustment programme: the Commission shall inform orally the Chair and Vice-Chairs of 
EP economic and monetary affairs committee of the progress made in preparation of the programme and 
on the conclusions drawn from the monitoring of the programme. However, the information received 
should be treated as confidential. The macroeconomic adjustment programme should also be made public 
and the conclusions of the debt sustainability analysis should be annexed to it. 
Article 14 on post-programme surveillance: the Commission shall communicate every semester its 
assessment to the competent committee of the European Parliament and to the parliament of the Member 
State concerned. 
Economic dialogue 
In addition to receiving timely information, the Parliament will also be able to organise a dialogue with 
regard to the results of the enhanced and post-programme surveillance process. This is set out in the 
following articles: 
Article 3 on enhanced surveillance:  
In case a recommendation to adopt a precautionary or macro-economic adjustment programme has been 
made: 1) the competent committee of the EP may offer the opportunity to the Member State concerned 
and to the Commission to participate in an exchange of views; 2) the representatives of the Commission 
may be invited by the parliament of the Member State concerned to participate to an exchange of views. 
The Council shall in due time inform the relevant committee of the European Parliament about the 
content of the recommendation. 
During the course of the enhanced surveillance, the competent committee of the European Parliament and 
the national parliament concerned may invite representatives of the IMF, the ECB and the Commission to 
participate in an economic dialogue. 
Article 7 on the adjustment programme: the competent committee of the European Parliament may offer 
the opportunity to the Member State concerned and the Commission to participate in an exchange of 
views on the progress made in the implementation of the adjustment programme. Representatives of the 
Commission may also be invited by the national parliament of the Member State concerned to an 
exchange of views on the progress made with the implementation of its macroeconomic adjustment 
programme. 
Article 14 on post-programme surveillance: the competent committee of the European Parliament may 
offer the opportunity to the Member State concerned to participate in an exchange of views on the 
progress made under the post-assistance surveillance. The parliament of the Member State concerned 
may also invite the Commission to participate in an exchange of views on the post-assistance 
surveillance. 
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5.2. Involvement of stakeholders 
A number of references have been introduced in the legislation to ensure that the Member States 
concerned shall seek the views of social partners as well as relevant civil society organisations when 
preparing a draft macroeconomic adjustment programme (article 8). The aim is to contribute to 
building a consensus over the content of the programme.  
The role of social partners is further strengthened in the legislation by a number of specific 
references in article 1.4. In this article is specified that when applying the regulation, article 152 of 
the TFEU on the role of social partners in the Union shall be fully observed. Moreover, the existing 
practices and article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU on the right of collective 
bargaining and action shall be taken into account. 
 
6. UPDATING THE EU GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK FOR NON-
EURO AREA MEMBER STATES 
Following the adoption of the Two-Pack and in particular the new regulation on enhanced 
surveillance for the euro area, it has become necessary to also update the existing economic 
governance framework for the non-euro area Member States. In particular "Regulation (EC) no 
332/2002 establishing a facility providing medium-term financial assistance for Member States' 
balances of payments" needs to be updated. The existing regulation aims at easing the external 
financing constraint of Member States that are experiencing or are seriously threatened by 
difficulties in their balance of payment and applies only to non-euro area Member States. On the 
22nd of June 2012, the European Commission has come forward with a proposal to revise this 
regulation.12  
This revision will allow updating the existing Regulation in the light of the recent reinforcement of 
economic governance and in particular the entry into force of the new regulation on enhanced 
surveillance with a view to ensuring a larger level playing field between euro area and non-euro area 
Member States. For that reason, an effort is undertaken in the revision to ensure the alignment of the 
revised regulation with the content as well as number of procedural steps that have been outlined in 
the new enhanced surveillance regulation. For example, also the new revised regulation will include 
a simplification of the monitoring of programme countries whereby the reporting and monitoring 
under the SGP, the  application of the MIP and the monitoring under the EU semester are suspended 
for the duration of the programme.  
In the context of the economic and financial crisis, new assistance tools have been created for euro 
area Member States with the establishment of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), the 
European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) and the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM). However, the existing Regulation for non-euro area Member States has not kept pace with 
these developments. In particular, these financial stability mechanisms have established new 
precautionary instruments to provide financial assistance to the euro area Member States. The 
revision will allow non-euro Member States to have similar financial instruments at their disposal. 
                                                 
12 Proposal for a Council Regulation establishing a facility for providing financial assistance for Member States whose currency is not the euro. 
COM(2012)336. 
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ANNEX 1:  
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
Guideline on Precautionary Financial Assistance13 
Article 1  
Aim and scope 
The objective of precautionary financial assistance is to support sound policies and prevent crisis 
situations by allowing ESM Members to secure the possibility to access ESM assistance before they 
face major difficulties raising funds in the capital markets. Precautionary financial assistance aims at 
helping ESM Members whose economic conditions are still sound to maintain continuous access to 
market financing by reinforcing the credibility of their macroeconomic performance while ensuring 
an adequate safety-net.  
Article 2  
Types of precautionary financial assistance 
1. Precautionary financial assistance may be provided via a Precautionary Conditioned Credit Line 
(PCCL) or via an Enhanced Conditions Credit Line (ECCL). A PCCL and an ECCL credit line 
can be drawn via a loan or a primary market purchase. Both types of credit line shall have an 
initial availability period of one year and shall be renewable twice, each time for six months.  
2. Access to a PCCL shall be based on pre-established conditions and limited to ESM Members 
where the economic and financial situation is still fundamentally sound. A global assessment 
shall be made on whether a potential beneficiary ESM Member qualifies for a PCCL, using as a 
basis the following criteria:  
(a) Respect of the commitments under the stability and growth pact. An ESM Member under 
excessive deficit procedure may still access a PCCL, provided it fully abides by the Council 
decisions and recommendations aimed at ensuring a smooth and accelerated correction of its 
excessive deficit.  
(b) A sustainable general government debt.  
(c) Respect of the commitments under the excessive imbalance procedure (EIP). An ESM 
Member under EIP may still access a PCCL, provided it is established that it remains 
committed to addressing the imbalances identified by the Council.  
(d) A track record of access to international capital markets on reasonable terms.  
(e) A sustainable external position.  
(f) The absence of bank solvency problems that would pose systemic threats to the stability of 
the euro area banking system.  
3. The beneficiary ESM Member shall ensure a continuous respect of the eligibility criteria after 
the PCCL is granted, which shall be monitored by the European Commission, in liaison with the 
ECB.  
4. Access to an ECCL shall be open to ESM Members that do not comply with some of the 
eligibility criteria required for accessing a PCCL but whose general economic and financial 
situation remains sound. The beneficiary ESM Member shall, after consultation of the European 
Commission and of the ECB, adopt corrective measures aimed at addressing the above-
mentioned weaknesses and avoiding any future problems in respect of access to market 
                                                 
13 As requested by the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism, the ESM Board of Directors adopted detailed 
guidelines on the modalities for implementing the various ESM financial assistance instruments including the precautionary 
financial assistance instrument. 
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financing, while ensuring a continuous respect of the eligibility criteria which were considered 
met when the credit line was granted. The monitoring of the respect of the eligibility criteria and 
of any corrective measures shall be ensured by the European Commission, in liaison with the 
ECB, in line with the provisions foreseen in Article 5. 
Article 3 
Procedures for granting precautionary financial assistance 
In order to benefit from an ESM credit line, the request by the ESM Member shall follow the 
following steps: 
1.  An ESM Member may address a request for precautionary financial assistance to the 
Chairperson of the ESM Board of Governors.14 On receipt of such a request, the Chairperson of 
the Board of Governors shall entrust the European Commission, in liaison with the ECB, with 
the following tasks: 
(a) to assess the existence of a risk to the financial stability of the euro area as a whole or of 
its Member States; 
(b) to assess whether general government debt is sustainable. Wherever appropriate and 
possible, such an assessment shall be conducted together with the IMF; 
(c) to assess the actual or potential financing needs of the ESM Member concerned. 
2. In addition, the European Commission shall be requested to, in liaison with the ECB, assess 
whether the ESM Member concerned meets the conditions for accessing a PCCL or an ECCL as 
set out in Article 2(2) and 2(4), respectively.  
3. On the basis of the request of the ESM Member and the assessments referred to in paragraphs 1 
and 2, the Managing Director shall prepare a proposal for financial assistance consistent with 
the aforementioned assessment and taking into account the financial situation of the ESM. On 
this basis, the Board of Governors may decide to grant, in principle, precautionary financial 
assistance to the ESM Member concerned in the form of a PCCL or an ECCL as well as its 
amount and duration in accordance with Article 13(2) of the ESM Treaty. 
4. If a decision is adopted pursuant to paragraph 3, the Board of Governors shall, in accordance 
with article 13(3) of the ESM Treaty, entrust: 
a. The European Commission – in liaison with the ECB and, wherever possible, together 
with the IMF – with the task of negotiating, with the ESM Member concerned, an MoU 
detailing the policy conditions attached to the precautionary financial assistance.  
b. The Managing Director of the ESM, with the task of preparing, in parallel, a proposal 
for a financial assistance facility agreement (FFA), detailing the financial terms and 
conditions of the precautionary financial assistance, to be adopted by the Board of 
Governors.  
5. The European Commission shall sign the MoU on behalf of the ESM, subject to compliance 
with the conditions set out in paragraph 4(a) and approval by the Board of Governors. The 
Managing Director of the ESM shall sign the financial assistance facility agreement, subject to 
approval by the Board of Directors. 
Article 4 
Activating a credit line 
1. The activation of the credit line shall be at the initiative of the beneficiary ESM Member. The 
Member shall have the flexibility to request the draw-down of funds at any time during the 
                                                 
14  This should be done taking into account Recital 8 of the ESM Treaty. 
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availability period of the credit line according to the agreed terms. It shall inform the ESM at 
least a week in advance of its intention to draw funds, depending on the intended size.  
2. The maximum size of a tranche or primary market purchase shall be set in the initial decision to 
grant a credit line.  
Article 5 
 Enhanced surveillance 
1. Where an ECCL is granted or a PCCL drawn, the ESM Member shall be subject to enhanced 
surveillance by the European Commission for the availability period of the credit line. An ESM 
Member under enhanced surveillance shall, in consultation and cooperation with the European 
Commission, acting in liaison with the ECB, the European Supervisory Authorities (ESA) and 
the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), and where appropriate the IMF, adopt measures 
aimed at addressing the sources or potential sources of difficulties. 
2. On a request from the European Commission, the ESM Member under enhanced surveillance 
shall: 
a) Provide the ESM with all necessary information required for the execution of its lending 
activity and related risk management, such as monthly information regarding its financial 
condition, cash balance and other key information that would usually be provided for 
facilities of this type and any of the information mentioned in points (b) to (f); 
b) Communicate to the European Commission, the ECB, and the relevant ESA(s) at the 
requested frequency disaggregated information on developments in its financial system. 
The European Commission, the ECB, and the relevant ESA(s) shall preserve the 
confidentiality of the disaggregated data received; 
c) Carry out, under the supervision of the relevant ESA(s), stress test exercises or sensitivity 
analyses as necessary to assess the resilience of the financial sector to various 
macroeconomic and financial shocks, as specified by the European Commission and the 
ECB in liaison with the relevant ESA(s) and the ESRB, and share the detailed results with 
them; 
d) Be subject to regular assessments of its supervisory capacities over the banking sector in the 
framework of a specific peer review carried out by the relevant ESA(s); 
e) Carry out and report on a comprehensive independent audit of the accounts of the general 
government conducted in coordination with national supreme audit institutions, aiming at 
assessing the reliability, completeness and accuracy of these public accounts for the 
purposes of the excessive deficit procedure. In this context, the European Commission 
(Eurostat) shall assess the quality of data reported by the beneficiary ESM Member in 
accordance with Regulation (EC) No 679/2010; 
f) Where appropriate, provide additional information for the purposes of monitoring the 
progress towards the correction of the excessive deficit. 
3. The European Commission shall conduct, in liaison with the ECB and the ESA(s) as needed, 
and where appropriate the IMF, regular review missions in the ESM Member under surveillance 
to verify the progresses made in the implementation of the adopted measures. It shall 
communicate, every quarter, its findings to the Board of Directors and assess notably whether 
further policy measures are needed.  
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Article 6 
Warning system 
The ESM shall establish an appropriate warning system, in accordance with Article 13(6) of the 
ESM Treaty, to ensure that the ESM receives any repayments due by the ESM Member under the 
stability support in a timely manner. 
Article 7 
Re-examination of the adequacy of the precautionary financial assistance 
1. The adequacy of the precautionary financial assistance shall be assessed on a proposal from the 
ESM Managing Director based on the findings referred to in Article 5(3) or, where a PCCL has 
been granted but not drawn, the results of the regular EU multilateral surveillance procedure. 
The Board of Directors shall decide on the basis of this proposal whether the credit line should 
be maintained.  
2. In case the beneficiary ESM Member deviates from its policy conditions or if those 
commitments have become clearly inadequate to resolve the threat of financial disturbance, the 
Board of Governors may decide to close the credit line. The beneficiary ESM Member would 
then be expected to request a regular stability support, with a full macroeconomic adjustment 
programme, following the procedure applicable to it.  
After the beneficiary ESM Member has drawn funds for the first time via a loan or a primary market 
purchase, the Board of Directors shall decide on a proposal from the Managing Director and based 
on an assessment conducted by the European Commission, in liaison with the ECB, whether the 
credit line continues to be adequate or whether another form of financial assistance is needed. 
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